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Thoughts About Giles and Forfeiture
in Domestic Violence Cases
*

Myrna S. Raeder†
INTRODUCTION
In choosing a topic for this festschrift celebrating
Professor Berger’s venerable career as an evidence professor
and scholar, I decided that since there were likely to be many
contributions in the field of scientific evidence, I would write
instead about a recent Supreme Court pronouncement
concerning the Confrontation Clause. Nearly twenty years ago,
Professor Berger explicated a prosecutorial restraint model of
Confrontation Clause analysis.1 She has also authored Supreme
Court amici briefs in Idaho v. Wright2 and Lilly v. Virginia.3
While I am sure she will not agree with all of my views about
Giles v. California,4 I know that she will enjoy reading about
the topic.
Crawford v. Washington5 was a watershed case in
Confrontation Clause jurisprudence, which rejected the
reliability test articulated in Ohio v. Roberts6 in favor of a
*

© 2010 Myrna S. Raeder. All rights reserved.
2008-2009 Justice Marshall F. McComb Professor of Law, Southwestern
Law School. This essay is dedicated to Professor Margaret Berger, a mentor and friend,
whose acuity of analysis permeates all of her writings.
1
Margaret A. Berger, The Deconstitutionalization of the Confrontation
Clause: A Proposal for a Prosecutorial Restraint Model, 76 MINN. L. REV. 557 (1992).
2
See Brief Amicus Curiae of the American Civil Liberties Union in Support
of Respondent, Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805 (1990) (No. 89-260), 1989 WL 1127312.
Wright held statements of a young child who did not testify and which were admitted
pursuant to a state residual exception that mirrored what is now Federal Rule of
Evidence 807 violated the Confrontation Clause because they lacked particularized
guarantees of trustworthiness. 497 U.S. at 822-23.
3
See Motion for Leave to File and Brief Amicus Curiae of the American Civil
Liberties Union and the ACLU of Virginia, in Support of Petitioner, Lilly v. Virginia,
527 U.S. 116 (1997) (No. 98-5881), 1998 WL 901782. Lilly held the admission of a
nontestifying accomplice’s confession as a declaration against the declarant’s penal
interest violated defendant's Confrontation Clause rights. 527 U.S. at 142.
4
128 S. Ct. 2678 (2008).
5
541 U.S. 56 (2004).
6
448 U.S. 56 (1980).
†
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“testimonial” approach. Justice Scalia’s originalist reading of
the Confrontation Clause now requires exclusion of testimonial
hearsay if the declarant does not testify at trial, unless the
prosecution can demonstrate the declarant is unavailable and
there was a previous opportunity to cross-examine her.7 In the
wake of Crawford’s reshaping of Confrontation Clause
analysis,8 lower courts were left reading tea leaves to discern
how to apply this new framework, particularly in domestic
violence cases where the complainant typically refuses to
testify, or has been permanently silenced by her abuser.
The rub then, was to figure out what is testimonial and
what is not in a domestic violence setting, a matter not
inconsequential given that Crawford led to wholesale
dismissals of domestic violence charges, and increased the
number of trials of defendants who refused to plead guilty
optimistically predicting that the absence of the complainant
would result in their acquittal.9 The domestic violence advocacy
community hoped the next major Confrontation Clause case,
Davis v. Washington,10 would opt for a domestic violence
exception to general Confrontation Clause analysis. Failing
this, they urged a contextual view of domestic violence that
recognized the patterned nature of such abuse, and, as
Professor Tuerkheimer has suggested, its temporal aspects.11
Davis consolidated two separate cases in which the
complainants failed to testify at trial, one involving a 911 call
introduced against Davis, and the other involving statements
made to officers at the defendant Hammon’s home by his wife.
While Davis was supposed to fill in the blanks, its
bright-line test for determining if a statement is testimonial
has been criticized as unworkable by Justice Thomas,12 and
does not answer many of the hard questions posed when trying
to define testimonial statements.13 Davis’ circuitous definition
7

541 U.S. 36 (2004).
Id. at 53-54.
9
See, e.g., Tom Lininger, Prosecuting Batterers after Crawford, 91 VA. L.
REV. 747, 750, 820 (2005).
10
547 U.S. 813 (2006).
11
See, e.g., Deborah Tuerkheimer, Exigency, 49 ARIZ. L. REV. 801, 823 (2007);
Deborah Tuerkheimer, Renewing the Call to Criminalize Domestic Violence: An
Assessment Three Years Later, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 613, 616 (2007); see also Deborah
Tuerkheimer, Forfeiture After Giles: The Relevance of “Domestic Violence Context”, 13
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 711, 721-30 (2009).
12
Id. at 842 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
13
See, e.g., Myrna S. Raeder, Domestic Violence Cases After Davis: Is the Glass
Half Empty or Half Full?, 15 J.L. & POL’Y 759 (2007) [hereinafter Raeder, After Davis].
8
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of testimonial statements, essentially saying statements are
testimonial, unless they are not, predictably led to even more
confusion about applying the testimonial approach to dual
purpose statements—statements in which the victim sought
help from law enforcement, but which also arguably serve as
after-the-fact descriptions of criminal behavior.
Unhappy with the mixed result in Davis, which
reversed Hammon’s conviction and affirmed the conviction of
Davis,14 victims’ advocates pinned their hopes on forfeiture by
wrongdoing as a way to ensure the admission at trial of
testimonial statements made by absent domestic violence
victims. In other words, if the defendant’s own conduct caused
the absence of the declarant at trial, then the defendant had
forfeited his right to object to the admission of her testimonial
hearsay. Crawford’s oblique reference to forfeiture was
reiterated in Davis,15 emboldening advocates to argue that
forfeiture was required when the defendant killed a victim who
had previously made statements to the police identifying him
as her abuser. A number of courts readily agreed and did not
require any demonstration that the defendant actually
intended to cause the victim to be absent as a witness at trial
to establish forfeiture.16 Instead, they only required a
preliminary fact showing that the defendant murdered the
victim thereby causing her unavailability.
Giles v. California17 was typical of such cases. The
defendant was charged with murdering his ex-girlfriend,
Brenda Avie. No one saw the incident, although the
defendant’s niece heard the victim call “Granny” several
times.18 Brenda’s wounds were consistent with her having been
the victim, rather than the assailant, but the defendant
claimed she was insanely jealous, had threatened him, and had
previously pulled a knife on someone else.19 The defendant
further claimed he got a gun in self-defense and shot her
accidentally.20 To rebut this, the prosecution offered the victim’s
statements to an officer describing a previous incident of
14

Davis, 547 U.S. 813.
Id. at 833.
16
See United States v. Garcia-Meza, 403 F.3d 364 (6th Cir. 2005); United
States v. Mayhew, 380 F. Supp. 2d 961 (S.D. Ohio 2005); State v. Meeks, 88 P.3d 789
(Kan. 2004); People v. Moore, 117 P.3d 1 (Colo. Ct. App. 2004).
17
128 S. Ct. 2678 (2008).
18
Id. at 2681.
19
Id.
20
Id.
15
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domestic violence, where she claimed the defendant was
jealous and threatened to kill her if she cheated on him.21 The
court admitted these statements pursuant to a hearsay
exception that allowed admission of threats of bodily harm, and
the prosecution argued that the defendant forfeited his right to
confront the victim.22
Giles provided the Supreme Court with an opportunity
to define the boundaries of forfeiture. Instead, like Crawford
and Davis, Giles left open more questions than it answered,
further muddying the waters in domestic violence cases, and
offering no guidance about interpreting forfeiture in child
abuse litigation. Giles explicitly held that constitutional
forfeiture required an intent to deter a witness from
testifying,23 in essence viewing such forfeiture as a sanction for
witness tampering, not simply an equitable remedy for
preventing the victim from testifying. It reached this
conclusion by delving into the historic record. Again, like
Crawford and Davis, the majority decision was written by
Justice Scalia. Again, he utilized an originalist approach, and
again his reading of history was challenged by other Justices.
While the holding appears to be a blow to prosecutors trying to
admit statements of dead victims, dicta in three of the five
opinions in Giles taken together implies that potentially all of
the Justices are inclined to treat evidence of forfeiture flexibly
in domestic violence murder cases. Moreover, the case offers a
number of other hints about how individual judges think about
the evolving testimonial framework. Giles also raises questions
about the nature and function of originalism in constitutional
analysis.
I.

ORIGINALISM

Giles began with a reprise of Crawford’s admonition
that the Confrontation Clause was “most naturally read as a
reference to the right of confrontation at common law,
admitting only those exceptions established at the time of the
founding.”24 I have previously argued that originalism is bound
to silence voices that were not heard in 1791, when the Sixth
Amendment was adopted. At that time, domestic violence was
21
22
23
24

Id. at 2681-82.
Id. at 2682.
Id. at 2692.
Id. (quoting Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 54 (2004)).
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neither understood, nor criminalized, and the power of
chastisement was recognized by the rule of thumb.25 Moreover,
surviving wives would have been disqualified as witnesses
against their husbands under the spousal disqualification
doctrine. As the Court in Trammel v. United States26 observed:
This spousal disqualification sprang from two canons of medieval
jurisprudence: first, the rule that an accused was not permitted to
testify in his own behalf because of his interest in the proceeding;
second, the concept that husband and wife were one, and that since
the woman had no recognized separate legal existence, the husband
was that one. From those two now long-abandoned doctrines, it
followed that what was inadmissible from the lips of the defendanthusband was also inadmissible from his wife.27

Therefore, it is not surprising that the cases referred to in
Giles’ historic analysis are murder cases.
Generally, trials looked nothing like they do today:
neither the defendant, nor the interested witnesses testified,
there was virtually no hearsay, no police officers to investigate
or testify, and the trials were typically very short.28 Thus, using
a historic approach towards confrontation, which has been
described as a trial right,29 is likely to produce incongruous
results. While originalists commonly maintain that historic
rights can be applied to unforeseen situations, it is somewhat
different to untether the common law right of crossexamination from its 1791 context and then apply it to a world
that not only uses substantially different evidentiary rules and
investigative practices, but also reflects totally different social
and political judgments about domestic violence.
Further, the focus on the historic record has not
resulted in consensus about the common law jurisprudence.
Not only have several justices argued with the majority’s views
about the nature of the confrontation right in 1791,30 but
academics and legal historians have also weighed in on

25

Myrna S. Raeder, Remember the Ladies and Children Too: Crawford’s Impact
on Domestic Violence and Child Abuse Cases, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 311, 311-14 (2005)
[hereinafter Raeder, Remember the Ladies]; Raeder, After Davis, supra note 13, at 774-75.
26
445 U.S. 40 (1980).
27
Id. at 44.
28
See Raeder, Remember the Ladies, supra note 25, at 312.
29
Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 832 n.6 (2006).
30
See, e.g., Giles v. California, 128 S. Ct. 2678, 2700-05 (2008) (Breyer, J.,
joined by Stevens, & Kennedy, JJ., dissenting); Davis, 547 U.S. at 835-40 (Thomas, J.,
concurring in part in judgment, and dissenting in part); Crawford v. Washington, 541
U.S. 36, 72-74 (2004) (Rehnquist, C.J., and O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment).
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opposite sides of the issue.31 Thomas Davies, a legal historian,
has argued that hearsay exceptions other than dying
declarations were invented only after the framing, and that the
framers would likely have condemned the expansion of hearsay
exceptions.32 Therefore, it is odd to posit a theory of forfeiture
for hearsay that would not have been admitted. I have often
wondered why this reality has not produced arguments that
hearsay exceptions enacted legislatively after 1791 are per se
testimonial, since they are creations of governmental action
that admit uncross-examined statements, just like those
created by law enforcement. Moreover, as Justices Souter and
Ginsburg indicated in their concurrence in Giles, “today’s
understanding of domestic abuse had no apparent significance
at the time of the Framing, and there is no early example of the
forfeiture rule operating in that circumstance.”33 Despite
Justice Scalia’s originalist view that intention to cause the
witness’ absence at trial is necessary to establish forfeiture, he
is willing to accept evidence of forfeiture based on a concept of
isolation in the domestic violence context that is decidedly
unoriginalist.
History also presents an alternative view of forfeiture
requiring cross-examination. As I have discussed elsewhere,
under a testimonial regime, Reynolds would have admitted the
previous testimony of the defendant’s wife without any
discussion of forfeiture, because it had been cross-examined.34
Of course, as Justice Scalia recognized, if forfeiture could not
occur without cross-examination, it would render the theory
irrelevant in the modern testimonial context.35 But, rather than
viewing this disconnect as questioning his historic analysis,36

31

Compare Thomas Y. Davies, What Did the Framers Know, and When Did
They Know It? Fictional Originalism in Crawford v. Washington, 71 BROOK. L. REV.
105, 156-62 (2005), with Robert Kry, Confrontation Under the Marian Statutes: A
Response to Professor Davies, 72 BROOK. L. REV. 493, 494 (2007).
32
Thomas Y. Davies, Not “The Framers’ Design”: How the Framing-Era Ban
Against Hearsay Evidence Refutes the Crawford-Davis “Testimonial” Formulation of the
Scope of the Original Confrontation Clause, 15 J.L. & POL’Y 349, 352 (2007).
33
Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2695.
34
Myrna S. Raeder, Domestic Violence, Child Abuse, and Trustworthiness
Exceptions After Crawford, CRIM. JUST. 24, 31 (Summer 2005).
35
Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2691 (“it amounts to self-immolation”).
36
See Leading Cases, Sixth Amendment—Witness Confrontation—Forfeiture
by Wrongdoing Doctrine, 122 HARV. L. REV. 336, 345 (2008) (arguing forfeiture applied
to domestic violence is poor candidate for originalism).
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Justice Scalia claims intentionality is a historic feature of
forfeiture.37
But the larger questions are why has originalism
overtaken Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause analysis at
all, and does it have any significance for interpretation of other
criminal procedural and trial rights? Arguably, if a strict
originalist approach were applied to other constitutional
guarantees it would likely strip away many of the rights
criminal defendants now enjoy. For example, Washington v.
Texas, which rejected the traditional witness disqualification
rule under its interpretation of the Sixth Amendment right to
compulsory process, quoted a Supreme Court decision from
1918 for the proposition that modern criminal procedure should
not be governed by “the dead hand of the common-law rule of
1789.”38 Would the present focus on originalism discount
compulsory process or other rights bound up in the right to
present a defense?39 Similarly, Professor Dripps has suggested
that the right to counsel could be affected by originalist
reinterpretation.40 The irony of originalism in the Confrontation
Clause context is that the right sounds absolute and defenseoriented, but the historic approach narrowly construes the
content of the right, making it inapplicable to accusatory
nontestimonial hearsay where the defendant would want to
cross-examine the unavailable declarant. In essence,
originalism gives with one hand and takes away with the other.
This same type of push-pull is becoming more noticeable
in Fourth Amendment analysis. Professor Davies has
contended that under “law-and-order originalism, the
expansive police powers endorsed in contemporary search and
seizure rulings are foreign to the Framers’ understanding of
criminal procedure.”41 In addition, in the Fourth Amendment
37

Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2683.
388 U.S. 14, 21-22 (1967) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Rosen v. United States, 245 U.S. 467, 471 (1918) (affirming elimination of
disqualification for felony conviction and reversing conviction for refusal to permit
accomplice testimony)).
39
See generally, e.g., Martin A. Hewitt, Note, A More Reliable Right to
Present a Defense: The Compulsory Process Clause After Crawford v. Washington, 96
GEO. L.J. 273 (2007) (arguing for a narrower, bright-line test for the right to
compulsory process informed by Crawford).
40
See Donald A. Dripps, Sixth-Amendment Originalism’s Collision Course
with the Right to Counsel: What’s Titanic, What’s Iceberg? 2, 4 (San Diego Legal Stud.
Res. Paper Series, Paper No. 07-79, 2006), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=952508.
41
Thomas Y. Davies, The Fictional Character of Law-and-Order Originalism:
A Case Study of the Distortions and Evasions of Framing-Era Arrest Doctrine in
38
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arena, originalists appear to accept that rights such as “knock
and notice” existed at the founding, but then find that this does
not require suppression of any evidence obtained in violation of
that right, since the exclusionary rule is viewed as not
constitutionally required,42 and subject to review for
reasonableness.43 Even if the historic approach provides
inconclusive
results,
originalists
tend
to
interpret
reasonableness narrowly to reject an exclusionary remedy.44
Thus, in the post-Crawford era, Justice Scalia has written two
majority opinions concerning the Fourth Amendment using the
historic approach that denied the application of the
exclusionary rule.45 Ironically, the reasonableness review
depends on the same type of judicial balancing that Justice
Scalia denigrated when rejecting the Ohio v. Roberts46
reliability test in Crawford.47 Certainly, in the Fourth
Amendment context the resort to reasonableness has resulted
in shrinking protection for violations, as most recently
demonstrated in Herring v. United States,48 where the Court
asserted that it had “repeatedly rejected the argument that
exclusion is a necessary consequence of a Fourth Amendment
violation.”49 A cynic might wonder if the resort to
reasonableness as an end-run around the exclusionary rule
evolved from the failure of Justices Scalia and Thomas to
garner any support to jettison Miranda50 in the Fifth
Amendment context in Dickerson v. United States.51

Atwater v. Lago Vista, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 239, 240 (2002) (“[N]ineteenth and
twentieth centur[y] American courts abandoned the Framers’ commitment to
rigorously accusatorial criminal procedure as they drastically expanded police power.”).
42
See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974) (“[T]he rule is a
judicially created [rule] designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally
through its deterrent effect.”).
43
See, e.g., Hudson v. Michigan 547 U.S. 586, 595-96 (2006) (Scalia, J., majority
opinion); Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 934 (1995) (Thomas, J., majority opinion).
44
See Virginia v. Moore, 128 S. Ct. 1598, 1604 (2008) (no exclusion where
arrest was based on a misdemeanor driving offense that should not have resulted in
arrest under state law).
45
See id. at 1608; Hudson, 547 U.S. at 600.
46
448 U.S. 56 (1980).
47
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 67-68 (2004).
48
129 S. Ct. 695, 700 (2009) (exclusionary rule did not apply to police
recordkeeping error).
49
Id.
50
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
51
530 U.S. 428, 464-65 (2000) (Scalia & Thomas, JJ., dissenting).
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Similarly, although Justice Scalia’s concurrence
ostensibly favored the defense in Arizona v. Gant,52 which held
the search of a defendant’s car was unreasonable after he was
handcuffed, arrested, and secured in a patrol car, Justice
Scalia’s view of reasonableness based on historical practices
would actually allow searches not previously permitted. In
other words, he would also consider it reasonable to search a
vehicle not only when the object of the search is evidence of the
crime for which the arrest was made, but also “of another crime
that the officer has probable cause to believe occurred.”53
II.

DEFINING THE BOUNDARIES OF “TESTIMONIALISM”

Giles provides glimpses into some of the Justices’ views
about the boundaries of what I call “testimonialism.” The
majority decision mentions that statements in furtherance of a
conspiracy would probably never be testimonial,54 repeating a
similar pronouncement made in Crawford.55 Professor Berger
would not necessarily agree, since she suggested pre-Crawford
that statements to undercover informants should be governed
by her prosecutorial restraint model of confrontation to make
the government’s role in shaping evidence transparent to
jurors.56 Given the Court’s current view of confrontation as
restraining potential prosecutorial abuses, it is surprising that
this issue has been summarily dismissed, albeit by dicta, in
both Crawford and Giles, although this posture is consistent
with a view of testimonialism that applies the confrontation
right absolutely, but only to a very narrow range of statements.
Justice Scalia’s opinion did suggest that domestic
violence cases were not hampered by a non-intent-based
forfeiture rule because “[s]tatements to friends and neighbors
about abuse and intimidation, and statements to physicians in
the course of receiving treatment would be excluded, if at all,
only by hearsay rules, which are free to adopt the dissent’s
version of forfeiture by wrongdoing.”57 This reiterates
Crawford’s suggestion that the Confrontation Clause does not
apply outside of the law enforcement or governmental sphere,
52
53
54
55
56
57

129 S. Ct. 1710 (2009).
Id. at 1725.
Giles v. California, 128 S. Ct. 2678, 2691 n.6 (2008).
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 56 (2004).
See Berger, supra note 1, at 597-600.
Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2692-93.
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ignoring the realistic possibility that statements will be made
to private individuals as conduits for the express purpose of
repeating them to the authorities. Similarly, the reference to
physicians ignores any recognition that some doctors may be
mandated to report domestic abuse, or that they may in some
cases act as agents of the police, or in the case of forensic
nurses, have roles that are decidedly dual in nature. Yet, since
all of these references are dicta, written in general terms
without concrete examples, courts will likely continue to divide
on how broadly or narrowly they should interpret testimonial
statements.
While Justice Alito voted with the majority in Davis, he
joined Justice Thomas in Giles, questioning whether the
victim’s statement was testimonial because of its lack of
formality.58 This appears to retreat from his vote to reverse
Hammon’s conviction, since lack of formality would result in
virtually no statements made in field investigations or 911
calls being constitutionally protected because they were not
considered the “equivalent of statements made at trial by
‘witnesses.’”59 At a minimum, under this rationale, the
statements to the police in Hammon would be nontestimonial
even if the victim’s affidavit was not, suggesting its admission
would have rendered the error harmless. To date, this is still a
decidedly minority view, though Justice Scalia’s cryptic
reference that “we accept without deciding” that the
statements were testimonial60 leaves room to speculate whether
anyone else will jump ship. Ironically, the most likely
candidate would be Justice Scalia based on his pre-Crawford
view in White.61 However, given that he authored Davis, such a
result appears improbable.
Yet, there may be another way of arguing these
statements are not testimonial. Davis explained that when the
Court stated in Crawford “‘interrogations by law enforcement
officers fall squarely within [the] class’ of testimonial hearsay,
we had immediately in mind (for that was the case before us)
interrogations solely directed at establishing the facts of a past
crime, in order to identify (or provide evidence to convict) the

58
59
60
61

Id. at 2694.
Id.
Id. at 2682.
White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 364 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment).
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perpetrator.”62 Thus, Davis redefined testimonial statements in
the 911 or field investigation context, typical in domestic
violence prosecutions:
Statements are nontestimonial when made in the course of police
interrogation under circumstances objectively indicating that the primary
purpose of the interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet an
ongoing emergency. They are testimonial when the circumstances
objectively indicate that there is no such ongoing emergency, and that the
primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove past events
potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.63

However, this definition arose in a context where the
statements were being used in the prosecution of the crimes
arising out of the incident in question. That is not how the
evidence is used when domestic violence results in murder. In
other words, the previous statements are not being used to
convict the defendant of the earlier assault, but rather as
circumstantial evidence linking the defendant to a later crime
that was not committed at the time of the earlier statement.
While such statements are accusatory, and the defendant
would undoubtedly want to cross-examine the declarant about
them, this is not the approach to testimonialism adopted by the
Supreme Court.64 Indeed, considering such statements to be
testimonial in the murder case smacks of a science fiction
approach to crime, suggested by Minority Report, a film in
which individuals were apprehended for offenses before they
committed them.65 Assuming a free will approach to criminal
responsibility, accusing someone of a past crime arguably does
not qualify as testimonial when used as evidence of a future
crime that has not yet occurred.
This view is consistent with the Court’s explanation
that the right to confrontation only arises at trial: “[t]he
Confrontation Clause in no way governs police conduct,
because it is the trial use of, not the investigatory collection of,
ex parte testimonial statements which offends that provision.”66
The mere fact that statements arose out of a police
investigation should not per se label them as testimonial when
62

Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 826 (2006) (alteration in original)
(quoting Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 53 (2003)).
63
Id. at 822.
64
See generally, e.g., Robert P. Mosteller, “Testimonial” and the Formalistic
Definition—The Case for an “Accusatorial” Fix, 20 CRIM. JUST. 14 (Summer 2005).
65
MINORITY REPORT (Twentieth Century-Fox File Corp. et al. 2002).
66
Davis, 547 U.S. at 832 n.6 (emphasis omitted).
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introduced at a trial for some other separate crime as a piece of
circumstantial evidence to demonstrate motive or identity
pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence (“F.R.E.”) 404(b), or as
evidence of the decedent’s state of mind, which is relevant as in
Giles where the defendant claims the death was accidental or
that he acted in self-defense.67
This reasoning is analogous to that in Dowling v. United
States, which held that neither double jeopardy nor due process
were violated by the introduction of evidence relating to a
crime for which the defendant had previously been acquitted.68
Dowling was charged with a bank robbery in which the
perpetrator wore a ski mask and carried a small gun.69 At his
third trial for the robbery, a woman testified that Dowling
entered her home along with another individual, and he wore a
ski mask and carried a small gun.70 She was able to identify
Dowling because she unmasked him during a struggle.71 The
prosecution introduced this testimony on the theory that the
mode of dress in both incidents occurring two weeks apart was
similar, and the second man identified by the female witness
was also involved in the robbery, thereby linking Dowling to
him.72 However, Dowling had previously been acquitted of
charges relating to the witness’ testimony. The Court reasoned
that although the acquittal established that there was a
reasonable doubt that the defendant was the masked man who
entered the witness’ home two weeks after the bank robbery
took place, that fact “did not determine an ultimate issue in the
present case.”73 The decision recognized that the “jury’s verdict
in his second trial did not entail any judgment with respect to
the offenses charged in his first.”74 Moreover, under F.R.E.
404(b), similar act evidence is relevant if the jury can
reasonably conclude that the act occurred and that the
defendant was the actor, a standard satisfied by F.R.E. 104(b).75
In other words, it does not have to meet the preponderance
67

See Myrna S. Raeder, The Admissibility of Prior Acts of Domestic Violence:
Simpson and Beyond, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1463, 1506-17 (1996) [hereinafter Raeder,
Simpson and Beyond]; see also, e.g., State v. DeRosier, 695 N.W.2d 97, 105 (Minn. 2005).
68
493 U.S. 342, 343-44 (1990).
69
Id. at 344.
70
Id. at 344-45.
71
Id.
72
Id. at 345.
73
Id. at 347-48.
74
Id. at 353.
75
Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 689 (1988).
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standard that typically governs the admissibility of evidence,
let alone satisfy proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
Similarly, in a domestic violence murder trial the
victim’s previous statement to the police is not being used to
prove the offense that it describes, but simply constitutes evidence
that is inferentially used to support a finding of proof beyond a
reasonable doubt for a different crime, committed at a later time.
Therefore, the statement should not be considered testimonial for
that purpose. In a related vein, Crawford v. Commonwealth
recently held that statements in an affidavit supporting a request
for a civil protective order were not testimonial when the
defendant is later charged with the declarant’s murder, since her
statements were not made for the primary purpose of reporting a
past event for possible criminal prosecution.76
Because Giles did not specifically address whether
forfeiture applied to testimony initially obtained in one
proceeding, but subsequently introduced at a second proceeding
involving the same defendant charged with a different offense,
courts are now being asked that question. For example, United
States v. Vallee77 interpreted Giles’ “invitation . . . to the state
court to explore defendant’s intent on remand” as extending
forfeiture to murder trials, “provided . . . that the defendant
intended to prevent the witness from testifying at an earlier
proceeding.”78 Similarly, the Missouri Supreme Court
interpreted forfeiture to apply to both the ongoing proceeding
as well as the murder.79 This interpretation would be
unnecessary if a reevaluation of such statements deemed them
to be nontestimonial.
III.

OPENING THE DOOR TO STATE OF MIND TESTIMONIAL
STATEMENTS

Several of the statements in Giles and other domestic
violence femicides are relevant to the decedent’s state of mind,
which would be admissible under F.R.E. 803(3) when the
defendant claims that the killing was in self-defense or the
death was an accident or suicide.80 In such instances, the
76

686 S.E.2d 557, 568-69 (Va. Ct. App. 2009).
304 F. App’x 916 (2d Cir. 2008).
78
Id. at 920-21 & n.3.
79
See State v. McLaughlin, 265 S.W.3d 257, 271-73 (Mo. 2008) (en banc).
80
See, e.g., People v. Abordo Espinosa, No. A102886, 2005 WL 941454, at *5
(Cal. Dist. Ct. App. Apr 25, 2005) (“[E]vidence of domestic violence . . . was relevant to
rebut the defense’s theory that the shooting occurred in heat of passion in response to
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decedent’s state of mind, typically fear of the defendant, is a
window to her likely conduct in regard to the defendant. For
example, the majority in Giles detailed the statements made to
the police in the previous incident by Brenda Avie, the
decedent and Giles’ ex-girlfriend, that Giles had accused her of
having an affair, grabbed her, lifted her off the floor, choked
her, punched her in the face, opened a folding knife, and
“threatened to kill her if he found her cheating on him.”81
Brenda’s wounds, which were described as consistent with
defensive motions,82 would more likely be viewed as defensive if
there was evidence that she feared the defendant. Similarly,
the dissent characterized the defendant’s description of the
victim as “jealous, vindictive, aggressive, and violent.”83
Evidence of her fear would cast doubt on the defendant’s claim
that she was jealous and threatened him.
In this capacity, such statements should not be barred
as testimonial, even if they were made to a police officer. First,
the victim's statements are not being used to prove the crime
that the police were then investigating, so, as previously
mentioned, the decedent did not expect the statements to be
used in relation to the murder. Second, fear is not used to prove
an element of the current crime, but only to explain the
decedent’s behavior, in evaluating the defendant’s version of
the facts. Third, as I have argued elsewhere, by raising a
defense that makes the decedent’s state of mind relevant to the
case, the defendant’s trial strategy should be viewed as waiving
any confrontation challenge concerning otherwise admissible
evidence that rebuts the defendant’s testimony about the
decedent’s state of mind.84 On occasion, such state of mind may
be nonhearsay, which clearly escapes Crawford’s mandate.
However, even if admitted via a hearsay exception, the
statements would not typically be expected by the declarant to
be used at a trial involving a different incident. Of course,
F.R.E. 803(3) cannot be used to prove the underlying conduct
producing the declarant’s state of mind,85 so such statements
are viewed as prejudicial even if instructions are given as to
[victim’s] nagging, instead of as the culmination of a pattern of abuse.”); see also
Raeder, Simpson and Beyond, supra note 67, at 1506-17.
81
Giles v. California, 128 S. Ct. 2678, 2681-82 (2008).
82
Id. at 2681.
83
Id. at 2695 (Breyer, J., joined by Stevens & Kennedy, JJ., dissenting).
84
See Raeder, Remember the Ladies, supra note 25, at 358-60.
85
See FED. R. EVID. 803(3).

2010]

FORFEITURE IN DOMESTIC VIOLENCE CASES

1343

their limited use. However, if the defendant offers to stipulate
to the decedent’s state of mind, this factor can be analyzed by
the judge in determining if admission is unduly prejudicial
under the F.R.E. 403 balancing test.
Moreover, it is arguable that defenses based on
accident, suicide, and self-defense should make otherwise
admissible evidence of the defendant’s state of mind admissible
as well. For example Giles claimed Brenda was jealous, and
described her alleged threats and jealous statements. In
contrast, she described his threats and jealousy. In this
context, not only should his claim of accident and self-defense
open him to admission of her statements even if testimonial,
but it should also open him to the statements she made
concerning his state of mind, again assuming a basis for
admission other than F.R.E. 803(3). No reliance needs to be
given to forfeiture hearsay exceptions to cover her statement to
the police officer, since most of them would be excited
utterances or fit ad hoc trustworthiness exceptions. Thus, the
testimonial ban is the only barrier to their admission. If the
defendant opens the door with such a defense posture, I view it
no differently than any other hard strategy decision that opens
the door to otherwise inadmissible evidence. For example,
Michigan v. Lucas held that excluding evidence of defendant’s
past sexual conduct with the victim for failure to comply with a
rape shield’s notice provision is not a per se violation of the
Sixth Amendment.86 If trial strategy could result in the loss of a
constitutional right pre-Crawford, there is no reason to require
a different result post-Crawford.87
IV.

INFERRED INTENT

The justices disagreed about the role of intent in the
forfeiture analysis as well as how to evaluate intent in the
domestic violence setting. Obviously, the majority opinion will
be much cited in future domestic violence forfeiture cases to
evaluate the type of evidence justifying forfeiture:
Acts of domestic violence often are intended to dissuade a victim
from resorting to outside help, and include conduct designed to
prevent testimony to police officers or cooperation in criminal
86

500 U.S. 145, 152-53 (1991).
United States v. Lopez-Medina, 596 F.3d 716, 733 (10th Cir. 2010) (finding
waiver and citing other post-Crawford cases finding no Confrontation Clause violation
when defendant opens the door to inadmissible hearsay).
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prosecutions. Where such an abusive relationship culminates in
murder, the evidence may support a finding that the crime expressed
the intent to isolate the victim and to stop her from reporting abuse
to the authorities or cooperating with a criminal prosecution—
rendering her prior statements admissible under the forfeiture
doctrine. Earlier abuse, or threats of abuse, intended to dissuade the
victim from resorting to outside help would be highly relevant to this
inquiry, as would evidence of ongoing criminal proceedings at which
the victim would have been expected to testify.88

The majority separates its reference to the defendant’s
dissuading the victim to obtain help from its mention of the
existence of ongoing criminal proceedings. This disjunction
appears to eliminate any requirement for an ongoing
prosecution, generally implying that there need not be a
current case pending to find forfeiture. However, the dicta is
directed to abuse that culminates in murder, leaving open
whether the majority would infer intent in other types of
prosecutions, or whether felonies would be treated differently
than misdemeanors.
The concurrence of Justices Souter and Ginsburg
includes the following view of domestic violence evidence of
forfeiture:
[T]he element of intention would normally be satisfied by the intent
inferred on the part of the domestic abuser in the classic abusive
relationship, which is meant to isolate the victim from outside help,
including the aid of law enforcement and the judicial process. If the
evidence for admissibility shows a continuing relationship of this
sort, it would make no sense to suggest that the oppressing
defendant miraculously abandoned the dynamics of abuse the
instant before he killed his victim, say in a fit of anger.89

This language does not limit inferred intent to murder cases,
and the rationale provided describing the dynamics of domestic
violence extends to all manner of domestic violence
prosecutions. The broad language suggests that proof of the
abusive relationship is all that is needed for transferred intent.
Indeed, the dissent interprets Justice Souter’s concurrence as
meaning “that a showing of domestic abuse is sufficient to call
into play the protection of the forfeiture rule in a trial for
murder of the domestic abuse victim.”90 In contrast, the
majority indicates such evidence “may” support a finding,
inferring that some specific acts or statements of the defendant
88
89
90

Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2693.
Id. at 2695 (Souter, J., joined by Ginsburg J., concurring).
Id. at 2708 (Breyer, J., joined by Stevens & Kennedy, JJ., dissenting).
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are required to indicate an intent to isolate or dissuade the
victim from obtaining help.91
The dissent of Justices Breyer, Stevens, and Kennedy
would not require any witness-tampering intent at all for
forfeiture.92 Thus, it is clear that they will interpret this
requirement flexibly. They specifically note:
[e]ven the majority appears to recognize the problem with its
“purpose” requirement, for it ends its opinion by creating a kind of
presumption that will transform purpose into knowledge-based
intent—at least where domestic violence is at issue; and that is the
area where the problem is most likely to arise.93

Justice Scalia rejects the dissent’s characterization that this is
“nothing more than ‘knowledge-based intent,’”94 but his
disclaimer appears to be one of degree, rather than kind. Thus,
all of the justices would accept a flexible view of inferred intent
in domestic violence cases, but the nuances of how to establish
such intent, and how broadly to apply it is open to disagreement.
Professor Lininger has recently proposed presumptive brightline rules to govern claims of domestic violence forfeiture and
provide some consistency in application.95
I have always been of the view that murder is different
in the domestic violence context because the victim’s death is
often accomplished in ways that are aimed at frustrating
prosecution. Previous violence and threats instill fear in the
victims who downplay their risk of continuing danger, and
their murders are often accomplished at home without
witnesses. Thus, prior to Giles, I argued that previous
statements of the victim should be viewed akin to dying
declarations of individuals who are not isolated,96 relying on
Mattox v. United States.97 Mattox recognized that rules of law,
“however beneficent in their operation and valuable to the
accused, must occasionally give way to considerations of public
policy and the necessities of the case.”98 Ironically, while Justice
91

Id. at 2693 (majority opinion).
Id. at 2707-08 (Breyer, J., joined by Stevens. & Kennedy, JJ., dissenting).
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Id. at 2708 (emphasis omitted).
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Id. at 2693 (majority opinion).
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See Tom Lininger, The Sound of Silence: Holding Batterers Accountable for
Silencing Their Victims, 87 TEX. L. REV. 857, 892-93 (2009); see also Myrna S. Raeder,
Being Heard After Giles: Comments on The Sound of Silence, 87 TEX. L. REV. 105, 105
(2009) [hereinafter Raeder, After Giles].
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Scalia’s opinion adopts the rationale that abusive relationships
may support inferred intent, the two concurrers and three
dissenters appear to form a different majority who adopt this
rationale as proof of inferred intent without more. Thus, I
expect the only forfeiture problem in murder cases will be when
no classically abusive relationship can be established.
In contrast, I have been more hesitant to substitute
evidence of an abusive relationship as evidence of forfeiture
without more when the complainant is alive but refuses to
testify, since so many complexities about the relationship
confound an automatic finding that the defendant is the cause
of her unavailability. In other words, that approach ignores
reasons as to her unavailability that cannot be attributed to
acts of the defendant.99 Pre-Giles, I assumed specific evidence
would be required, though “patterns of abuse and any
posttraumatic stress disorder symptoms [w]ould be factored
into the analysis.”100 Yet, in future cases, the dissenters and
concurrers could form a majority that would neither confine
forfeiture to murder cases, nor require any evidence other than
that of an abusive relationship. Paradoxically, grafting the
modern view of the dynamics of domestic violence onto an
originalist framework may eliminate not only the traditional
requirement of any intent to witness tamper, but also the
requirement of any specific showing of inferred intent beyond
evidence of the abusive relationship in all cases, not just murder.
In addition, Justice Breyer’s suggestion that states may
accept broader forfeiture views in a nontestimonial context101
has already borne fruit in Indiana, where Roberts v. State102
held that a defendant forfeited any objection under the rules of
evidence. Obviously, evidence of the abusive relationship is
much less costly for the prosecution to obtain than specific
evidence of witness tampering, unless the victim is
uncooperative from the outset. Even without cooperation,
previous complaints by the victim to the police can be
evaluated by the court, since forfeiture would be decided under

99

Raeder, Remember the Ladies, supra note 25, at 363-64.
Myrna S. Raeder, Confrontation Clause Analysis After Davis, 22 CRIM.
JUST. 10, 19 (Spring 2007) [hereinafter Raeder, Confrontation Clause].
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Giles v. California, 128 S. Ct. 2678, 2681-82 (2008) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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894 N.E.2d 1018, 1024-25 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (“[A] party who has
rendered a witness unavailable for cross-examination through a criminal act, including
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F.R.E. 104(a), which permits consideration of hearsay.103 As I
have argued elsewhere, the F.R.E. 104(a) standard permits the
judge to consider character evidence including prior acts and
expert testimony concerning the defendant’s abusive
personality in determining the existence of forfeiture.104
As I have also previously argued elsewhere, to the
extent that an abusive relationship cannot be shown, in
misdemeanors cases where the defendant is already on
probation, parole, or supervised release, the better course may
be simply to argue for the most severe penalty at revocation,
since the Confrontation Clause is not implicated at such
hearings, and the standard of proof is typically by a
preponderance.105 Moreover, the absence of cross-examination
satisfies due process when a sufficient explanation exists.106 The
victim’s failure to cooperate or incompetency should supply
good cause, and the statements would usually be found reliable
because most of them would be admitted as excited utterances
or through ad hoc exceptions that require trustworthiness.
Ironically, while Hammon’s conviction was voided on
Confrontation Clause grounds, he was also found guilty of a
probation violation, and given his relatively short criminal
sentence, the same penalty might have been reached via the
revocation alone. The major difficulty with this approach is
that it downplays the significance of the current crime, unless
the defendant has previously committed a felony, which still
offers the possibility of a substantial penalty.
CONCLUSION
Where has my foray into testimonialism and forfeiture
taken me? Some may be surprised by my willingness to
interpret testimonialism narrowly, since it results in a
diminishment of cross-examination, something I have railed
against for many years. However, I have always favored a
balancing approach. And as this essay demonstrates, I have
never been a fan of testimonialism because it disregards the
core value of confrontation in relation to large quantities of
103
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nontestimonial hearsay offered against the defendant, while at
the same time dramatically impacting the prosecution for
events outside the government’s control, even when the
hearsay is reliable and critical to conviction.
Not surprisingly, courts have attempted to evade the
testimonial ban by finding the admission of testimonial
evidence to be harmless error. This has been particularly
evident in cases where the claim of forfeiture is rejected.107 The
Supreme Court recently noted, “[w]here a decision has ‘been
questioned by Members of the Court in later decisions and
[has] defied consistent application by the lower courts,’ these
factors weigh in favor of reconsideration.”108 One wonders
whether the Court will one day reject Crawford and its progeny
like it previously rejected Ohio v. Roberts,109 to return to a more
balanced Confrontation Clause approach as suggested by
Mattox v. United States.110
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